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Security & compliance

Security overview

The Pushizo security model — authentication, RBAC, tenant isolation (RLS), secret encryption, application security (SSRF, CSP, signatures), observability and audit logging; ASVS checklist.

Pushizo is a multi-tenant platform; every query is scoped by org_id/app_id, and Postgres row-level security (RLS) is the second line of defense. This page summarizes the model; for an evidence-backed list of controls, see the OWASP ASVS checklist.

Authentication

SurfaceMethod
DashboardPassword (Argon2id, at least 10 characters, breached-password check), opaque session cookie (HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Lax, 14-day sliding / 90-day absolute), TOTP MFA + recovery codes (can be enforced at the org level), Google/GitHub OAuth, SAML/OIDC SSO, login lockout (5 failures → 15 min), new-device email, optional Turnstile
Public APIAuthorization: Bearer hs_live_… API key: stored as SHA-256, scoped, app/org scope, IP allowlist, expiry date, revocation ≤ 5 s
SDK endpointsNo API key; proof of ownership via token_hash and identity verification (identity_hash HMAC or ES256 JWT)
Platform adminSeparate role, mandatory MFA (ADMIN_MFA_REQUIRED), actions that require a justification, read-only/write-enabled support sessions

Path canonicalization and credential-type separation by route pattern are enforced: API keys are only valid on /v1 routes, sessions only on /internal and /admin routes; Origin and content type are checked on /internal//admin mutations (CSRF).

Authorization (RBAC)

Roles: owner, admin, developer, marketer, composer, analyst, billing, viewer. The permission table comes from a single source (packages/tenancy) and is used both in API guards and in the dashboard menu; membership can be restricted to specific apps with app_scopes. API key scopes cannot exceed the permissions of the member who created the key (privilege escalation prevention). When the approval flow is on, a marketer cannot send; they submit for approval.

Tenant isolation

  • Every repository call takes a TenantContext; once the tenant context is resolved, the request runs in a single transaction with SET LOCAL app.current_org_id / app.current_app_id; in production the application role is NOSUPERUSER NOBYPASSRLS (Postgres roles).
  • Another tenant's resource returns 404 HS_NOT_FOUND (existence is not leaked).
  • An automatic isolation test for every endpoint (tenant A's key against tenant B's resource) is derived from the OpenAPI spec.
  • Storage keys are prefixed with org/{org_id}/app/{app_id}/…; signed URLs last 24 hours.
  • Data residency: a request outside the cell (EU/TR) returns 421 HS_WRONG_CELL; network policy blocks cross-cell access to the data layer (data residency).

Secret management

  • Envelope encryption: MASTER_KEY → wrapped data encryption keys (DEKs); a nonce per record, libsodium secretbox. Rotation command and MASTER_KEY replacement: key rotation.
  • Provider credentials (APNs p8/p12, FCM service account, SMTP password, Twilio token), the VAPID private key, webhook secrets, the SDK secret and custom webhook headers are stored encrypted; they can never be read back from the API/UI.
  • Redaction in logs (tokens, email, phone, OAuth/MFA parameters); body scrubbing with Sentry beforeSend; secret scanning in CI.

Application security

  • Zod schema validation at every boundary; JSON depth/size limits (1 MB, 5 MB for event batches).
  • SSRF: webhook, Data Feed, media and tenant SMTP addresses are checked against private IP ranges after DNS resolution, and the connection is pinned to the IP; redirects are not followed; allowlists for Web Push endpoints and FCM token_uri.
  • Output: email/in-app HTML sanitization, Liquid sandbox, linear-time HTML processing against ReDoS; CSP, HSTS, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy, X-Frame-Options.
  • Signatures: outgoing webhooks carry Pushizo-Signature (HMAC-SHA256, 5-minute tolerance, 24-hour rotation window); incoming provider webhooks (SNS, Svix/Resend, Twilio) are signature-verified; email tracking links are HMAC-signed (no open redirect).
  • Rate limiting and abuse: plan-based API rate limits and nginx IP limits (rate limits); 1,000 messages per day for the first 24 hours of a new org; channel suspension when complaint/bounce thresholds are exceeded; disposable email domain list; platform admin review queue.
  • Dependencies: npm audit, Dependabot, lockfile; secret scanning in CI (gitleaks).

Observability and audit

  • Every response carries x-request-id; logs can be matched with the request_id in the error envelope.
  • Audit log: who did what, when, and to which resource; at the org level via GET /v1/organization/audit-logs, a daily NDJSON SIEM stream and the audit.created webhook (integrations).
  • Prometheus metrics, Loki logs, Alertmanager alerts and blackbox probes (status and monitoring).

Compliance

  • KVKK (Turkish data protection law) / GDPR: data processor role, self-service rights for users and accounts, retention periods, DPA and subprocessor list (KVKK/GDPR compliance).
  • Enterprise identity: SAML 2.0 / OIDC SSO, "SSO only", SCIM 2.0 user/group provisioning (SSO, SCIM).
  • White-label and resellers: custom domain, branding, reseller accounts (white-label).
  • Vulnerability disclosure: https://pushizo.com/.well-known/security.txt.

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